Project 10 — Agricultural Competition and Seed Sovereignty

Four companies — Bayer, Corteva, Syngenta, and BASF — control approximately 56% of the global commercial seed market and 61% of the global pesticide market. In the U.S. specifically, just two companies (Bayer and Corteva) account for 72% of planted corn acres and 66% of planted soybean acres. This level of concentration has consequences most people never see at the grocery store but that shape almost everything about how food gets produced in this country. This proposal doesn't attempt to dismantle the existing agricultural biotechnology industry. It does three things: it strengthens antitrust enforcement in agricultural input markets, it reinvests in public-sector seed development and plant breeding, and it protects farmers' ability to save, replant, and share non-patented seed varieties.

How the system works

These companies develop and patent seeds — including genetically modified varieties — that are designed to work optimally with their own proprietary herbicides and pesticides. A farmer who buys Bayer's seed is functionally locked into buying Bayer's chemicals, because the seed was engineered for that pairing. Saving seeds from one season to replant the next — something farmers did for thousands of years — is prohibited under patent law for these varieties, and companies have aggressively litigated to enforce that prohibition. Between 1997 and 2010, Monsanto (now Bayer) filed 144 lawsuits and settled approximately 700 cases against farmers over seed patents.

The result is that farmers pay dramatically more for seeds than they used to. Between 1990 and 2020, seed prices paid by U.S. farmers increased an average of 170%. For crops grown predominantly with genetically modified traits, prices rose 463%. Meanwhile, public agricultural research — the kind done by the USDA and land-grant universities, which historically developed seed varieties and made them available to farmers at nominal cost — has been dwarfed. The combined R&D budget of the six largest seed companies is six times the USDA's agricultural research budget and twenty times that of international agricultural research centers.

Proposed policy text

Agricultural Competition and Seed Sovereignty Act

Section 1. Short title

This Act may be cited as the "Agricultural Competition and Seed Sovereignty Act."

Section 2. Findings

(a) Four corporations — Bayer, Corteva, Syngenta, and BASF — control approximately 56% of the global commercial seed market and 61% of the global pesticide market.

(b) In the United States, two companies (Bayer and Corteva) account for 72% of planted corn acres and 66% of planted soybean acres.

(c) Between 1990 and 2020, prices paid by U.S. farmers for crop seeds increased an average of 170%, and prices for seeds grown with genetically modified traits rose 463%, driven in part by expanded market power through intellectual property consolidation.

(d) Vertical integration between seed and pesticide production creates product-lock dependencies in which farmers purchasing proprietary seed varieties are functionally required to purchase the corresponding proprietary chemical inputs.

(e) Public agricultural research funding has declined relative to private-sector investment, reducing the availability of non-proprietary seed varieties and independent agronomic research.

(f) Agricultural biodiversity has declined dramatically; according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 75% of agricultural plant diversity was lost between 1900 and 2000, with three-quarters of global food production now derived from just twelve plant and five animal varieties.

(g) Concentration in agricultural input markets exceeds the 40% CR4 threshold that economists associate with market distortion and the 60% threshold that triggers heightened regulatory scrutiny.

Title I. Antitrust enforcement in agricultural input markets

Section 101. Agricultural Markets Competition Bureau

(a) There is established within the Department of Justice Antitrust Division an Agricultural Markets Competition Bureau (the "Bureau"), with dedicated authority and staff to investigate, monitor, and enforce antitrust law in seed, pesticide, fertilizer, and farm machinery markets.

(b) The Bureau shall:

(1) Conduct a comprehensive review of existing market concentration in seed, trait licensing, pesticide, and fertilizer markets within 18 months of enactment;

(2) Evaluate the competitive effects of the Bayer-Monsanto, Dow-DuPont/Corteva, and ChemChina-Syngenta mergers as actually realized, including whether conditions imposed by prior consent decrees have been effective in maintaining competition;

(3) Establish concentration thresholds specific to agricultural input markets, below which mergers and acquisitions shall be presumed anticompetitive;

(4) Investigate and, where appropriate, bring enforcement actions against anticompetitive practices including tying arrangements (requiring purchase of paired chemical products with seed), exclusionary licensing terms, and abuse of patent positions.

Section 102. Tying arrangement prohibition

(a) It shall be unlawful for any entity controlling more than 25% of any agricultural seed market to condition the sale, licensing, or warranty of any seed product on the purchase of a specific pesticide, herbicide, or other chemical input manufactured or sold by the same entity or its affiliates.

(b) Seed products may be marketed with recommended chemical inputs, but purchase of specific branded inputs shall not be a condition of sale, and warranties or trait performance guarantees shall not be voided solely on the basis of a farmer's use of compatible third-party inputs.

Section 103. Farmer right of repair

(a) Agricultural equipment manufacturers shall make available to equipment owners and independent repair providers the same diagnostic tools, parts, firmware, and technical documentation available to authorized dealers, at fair and reasonable cost.

(b) Equipment manufacturers shall not void warranties solely on the basis of owner or independent repair, provided the repair does not cause the defect at issue.

Title II. Public seed development and agricultural research

Section 201. National Public Seed Initiative

(a) The Secretary of Agriculture, through the Agricultural Research Service and in coordination with land-grant universities and cooperative extension programs, shall establish the National Public Seed Initiative (the "Initiative") to develop, maintain, and distribute high-performing, non-proprietary crop varieties adapted to regional conditions.

(b) The Initiative shall:

(1) Fund plant breeding programs at land-grant universities with the explicit mandate of developing open-source or public-domain crop varieties;

(2) Maintain and expand the USDA National Plant Germplasm System, with emphasis on preserving genetic diversity and regional adaptation;

(3) Develop and distribute non-proprietary seed varieties for crops critical to domestic food production, including vegetables, fruits, and staple grains;

(4) Publish all research results and make all publicly funded genetic material available for use without licensing fees to farmers, researchers, and independent seed companies.

(c) The Initiative shall receive an annual appropriation of not less than $200,000,000, representing a partial restoration of the historical ratio between public and private agricultural research investment.

Section 202. Integrated pest management research

(a) The Secretary shall establish a competitive grant program for research into non-chemical and reduced-chemical pest management strategies, including biological controls, crop rotation systems, companion planting, and breeding for pest resistance, with priority for approaches that reduce farmer dependence on proprietary chemical inputs.

Title III. Farmer seed sovereignty

Section 301. Seed saving protection

(a) Nothing in federal patent or plant variety protection law shall be construed to prohibit a farmer from saving, replanting, cleaning, or conditioning seed harvested from crops grown on the farmer's own land from non-patented varieties, including varieties developed with public funds under Title II.

(b) For patented varieties: existing law governing utility patents and Plant Variety Protection Certificates shall remain in effect, but the Secretary of Agriculture and the Patent and Trademark Office shall jointly issue guidance clarifying the scope of farmer exemptions under the Plant Variety Protection Act and identifying practices that do not constitute infringement.

Section 302. Seed labeling and transparency

(a) All seed sold in the United States shall be labeled to indicate:

(1) Whether the variety is subject to utility patents, Plant Variety Protection Certificates, or is in the public domain;

(2) Whether the variety requires specific chemical inputs for warranted performance;

(3) The identity of the patent holder or variety developer.

(b) This labeling requirement shall take effect 24 months after enactment.

Section 401. Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated:

(a) $50,000,000 per year for the Agricultural Markets Competition Bureau;

(b) $200,000,000 per year for the National Public Seed Initiative;

(c) $75,000,000 per year for Integrated Pest Management research grants;

(d) Such sums as necessary for seed labeling implementation.

Campaign analysis

What happened to the seed market

The agricultural input market didn't become concentrated overnight. In the 1980s, the top ten seed companies controlled less than 15% of the global market. Most seed was developed by public institutions — the USDA, land-grant universities — and made available to farmers at nominal cost. Farmers could and did save seed from season to season.

Then several things converged. The Supreme Court's 1980 Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision allowed the patenting of living organisms. Biotechnology created the possibility of engineering specific traits (herbicide tolerance, insect resistance) into seed lines. And a series of mergers, accelerating dramatically after 2015, consolidated the industry from a "Big Six" to a "Big Four." The Bayer-Monsanto merger alone cost $66 billion. The DOJ required Bayer to divest $9 billion in assets — the largest divestiture in DOJ history — but the resulting market structure remains far above concentration thresholds that economists consider problematic.

The USDA's own Economic Research Service documents the consequences. Two companies now control seed planting decisions on 72% of U.S. corn acres and 66% of soybean acres. Seed prices rose 463% for GM-trait crops between 1990 and 2020. The companies that sell seeds are the same companies that sell the pesticides those seeds are designed to require. Monsanto's Roundup Ready product line was explicitly engineered to perform optimally when paired with Monsanto's Roundup herbicide — creating what critics describe as a "pesticide treadmill" in which seed purchase functionally compels chemical purchase.

Meanwhile, public agricultural research has been starved. The combined R&D budget of the major seed companies is six times the USDA's agricultural research allocation. The varieties that public institutions historically developed — adapted to regional conditions, available without licensing fees — have been progressively displaced by proprietary alternatives. The UN FAO reports that 75% of agricultural plant diversity was lost in the 20th century. When a handful of companies control the genetic base of the food supply, and those companies' business model depends on selling paired seed-chemical packages, the incentive structure does not favor diversity, resilience, or independence.

What this proposal does

Antitrust enforcement. The dedicated Agricultural Markets Competition Bureau addresses a gap in existing DOJ capacity. Agricultural input markets are technically complex and require specialized expertise. The Bureau would conduct the first comprehensive post-merger competitive review of the industry since the 2016–2018 consolidation wave, and establish concentration thresholds tailored to the agricultural context.

Tying arrangement prohibition. The most immediately impactful provision. Banning the conditioning of seed sales on specific chemical purchases doesn't prohibit anyone from making or selling GM seeds or branded herbicides. It prohibits using market dominance in one to compel purchase of the other. Farmers would remain free to buy paired products if they choose; they just couldn't be contractually required to do so.

Public seed reinvestment. $200 million per year for public plant breeding is substantial relative to current public agricultural research funding but modest relative to private-sector R&D spending (Bayer alone spends billions annually). The goal is not to replace private seed development but to ensure that non-proprietary alternatives exist, that genetic diversity is maintained, and that farmers have choices beyond the products of four companies.

Seed sovereignty protections. Farmers saving and replanting non-patented seed is clarified as a right. For patented varieties, existing IP law remains in place — this proposal does not attempt to invalidate agricultural patents — but guidance is required to prevent enforcement overreach and ensure farmers understand what they can and cannot do.

Political dynamics

Agricultural antitrust has growing bipartisan traction. The USDA under multiple administrations has held public workshops on competition in agricultural markets. Farm-state legislators have expressed concern about input cost increases. Right-to-repair provisions for farm equipment have attracted particularly broad support — John Deere's restrictions on farmer repair have become a potent political symbol. The Trump and Biden administrations both signaled interest in agricultural competition, though through different policy frameworks.

The primary opposition will come from the four companies whose market position this proposal directly challenges. They will argue that patent protections and vertical integration are necessary to fund the R&D that produces yield-improving innovations. This argument has merit in the abstract but must be weighed against documented outcomes: 463% seed price increases, declining farmer choice, collapsing agricultural biodiversity, and a regulatory structure that has allowed concentration to far exceed normal antitrust thresholds.

Cross-project connections

References